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I. Accounting for Leverage
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and ensuing recession, there is
increasing recognition that changes in both public and private leverage – that
is, in the ratio of debt to some measure of debt-service capacity – may have
important macroeconomic implications. In most of this discussion, it is assumed,
often implicitly, that changes in leverage are driven primarily by changes in the
supply and/or demand for credit. But when there are existing large stocks of
debt, changes in income growth and inflation and nominal interest rates affect
the evolution of debt-income ratios independently of the decisions of lenders and
borrowers.
In this paper we offer an alternative accounting for the evolution of household
debt-income ratios, or leverage. We decompose leverage into the net borrowing
of the household sector on one hand, and the effects of nominal interest rates,
inflation and real income growth on the other. We call attention to the ways
in which variation in those latter three variables produce a divergence between
changes in debt-income ratios and changes in borrowing behavior. In particular,
our accounting implies that the rise in household debt-income ratios after 1980 is
best interpreted as primarily reflecting the effects of disinflation and higher nom-
inal interest rates on the existing household debt stock, rather than increased
household borrowing. Our focus is on the household sector’s debt-income ratio
– that is, on gross credit-market liabilities rather than net wealth or savings.
Because we are concerned with gross liabilities, we do not subtract net asset pur-
chases – real and financial – from debt changes, but combine household purchases
of assets with consumption, referring to both categories of spending together as
“expenditure.”
It is widely recognized in discussions of the evolution of public debt-GDP ratios
that income growth, inflation and interest rates have important mechanical effects
on the evolution of leverage independent of the government fiscal position. We
apply this same insight to the evolution of private leverage, showing how observed
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debt-income ratios reflect changes in income growth, inflation and interest rates,
as distinct from the effects of these variables on the supply and demand for
credit. For example, an acceleration in income growth may raise or lower desired
borrowing, but in either case it will directly reduce the ratio of debt to current
income. Historically, these mechanical effects have often been large, so changing
debt ratios gives a misleading impression of the evolution of borrowing. One might
expect that periods with more rapidly rising debt-income ratios will be those with
higher levels of expenditure in excess of income. But in several important cases
this turns out to be false.
Our accounting decomposition allows us to show how changes in interest and
growth rates distort the relationship between the intertemporal allocation of ex-
penditure through credit markets on the one hand, and observed debt-income
ratios, on the other. Further, it allows us to quantify this divergence across time.
We apply a modified version of the standard public-debt decomposition, and find
that the mechanical effects of changes in in growth inflation and interest rates
have been responsible for a large part of observed changes in household leverage
from 1929 to 2011. It is necessary to correct for these “Fisher dynamics” – the
mechanical effects of changes in these three variables on household debt-income
ratios independent of borrowing behavior – to form an accurate picture of the
evolution of household leverage. For the most recent period, it is also necessary
to take account of defaults.
An important finding is that the rise in household leverage during the 1980s and
early 1990s is not explained by any increased in credit-financed expenditure by
households, but instead by the combination of high nominal interest rates and dis-
inflation from 1980 to the late 1990s. Contrary to popular perceptions, the 1980s
did not see a rise in household borrowing relative to income, but rather a fall in
new borrowing that was, however, insufficient to offset the rise in debt service pay-
ments. Our accounting also suggests a striking similarity between the behavior
of household balances during the the Great Recession and the Great Depression.
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In both periods, there was a sharp reduction in new borrowing by households,
but this reduction was insufficient to significantly reduce household debt-income
ratios because it was offset by decelerations in inflation and household income,
combined with persistently positive nominal interest rates. Accounting for de-
faults – possible only for the most recent period – strengthens the case for the
importance of Fisher dynamics. While net new borrowing by households turned
sharply negative after 2007, these household surpluses were insufficient to offset
the increase in debt from continued real interest rates well above growth rates.
There would have been no household deleveraging since 2007 in the absence of a
sharply higher rate of defaults.
II. Motivation: The Importance of Private Leverage
A. Gross Debt versus Saving
Traditionally, economists have attributed only a minor role to private sector
leverage for the behavior of economic aggregates. While a minority of economists
going back at least to Irving Fisher have seen leverage as an important factor
influencing aggregate demand, the more common assumption is that debt mat-
ters only to the extent that it is reflected in household net wealth. (Benito and
Zampolli, 2007) Our premise is that in some cases changes in debt, and not just
savings or net wealth, are economically important. In particular, an interest in
leverage is usually motivated by the idea that economic units may sometimes
have difficulty meeting the cash commitments arising from previous borrowing.
When there is the possibility of default, both debtors and creditors will be con-
cerned with debtors’ capacity to service existing debt. If units face constraints
on new borrowing and assets are illiquid, debt service commitments must be
met out of current income flows. The greater is current debt, the larger will be
the contractually fixed debt-service payments, and the more likely the unit is to
face difficulties meeting them. So leverage matters in any situation where credit
constraints and illiquid assets may prevent agents from achieving their preferred
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allocation of income across periods. (Tirole, 2011) These constraints are likely
to be most important in financial crises and recessions. But they also matter to
the extent that the possibility of default limits access to credit even in periods of
financial stability.
Leverage is normally defined as the ratio of debt to either income (a flow) or
assets or wealth (a stock). For businesses, where future earnings both depend on
assets and should be capitalized into net worth, defining leverage as the ratio of
debt to some measure of wealth is generally appropriate; for households, which
receive mainly labor income and whose future income is not captured by any
stock with an observable market value, measuring leverage as the ratio of debt to
income is more appropriate. We use the ratio of debt to income.
Leverage Trends in the United States, 1929-2010
Figure 1, drawn from the Flow of Funds, shows private and public debt to GDP
ratios for the three main nonfinancial sectors since 1929.1 The large increases in
household and business debt relative to GDP between 1929 and 1933 are especially
striking since the nominal value of debt fell substantially for both of those sectors.
The leverage increases during this period are due to the fall in nominal GDP,
which in turn is due in about equal parts to deflation and the fall in real output.
In more recent decades we see a long-term upward trend in all three sectors’ debt.
This trend is common to most OECD countries (Cecchetti and Zampolli, 2010).
While the rise in public debt is responsible for the largest part of the increase in
nonfinancial debt over the past five years, over the past three decades increases
in business and, especially, household debt have been more important.
1The pre-1950 figures of business debt are from Goldsmith (1955), which gives figures only for selected
years. Since Goldsmith does not provide a category strictly equivalent to credit market liabilities as
reported in the Flow of Funds, we use the sum of payables to financial intermediaries, mortgages, and
bonds.
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Figure 1. Nonfinancial Leverage, 1929-2011.
Note: The lines show the gross nominal debt of the three domestic nonfinancial sectors relative to nominal
GDP. For nonfinancial businesses, pre-1945 data is taken from Goldsmith (1955), which includes estimates
only for selected years.
B. Leverage and Financial Crises
Leverage is most likely to matter in the context of a financial or banking crisis,
since that is when credit constraints are most likely to bind, and when the oper-
ation of the financial system may be impaired, rendering normally liquid assets
illiquid. The ratio of debt to income is one obvious indicator for the extent to
which debt commitments will continue to be honored in such a crisis. Leverage
may also play a role both in precipitating a crisis – since high leverage makes
any interruption in debt payments more likely to propagate across units – and
in determining the degree to which a financial crisis impairs coordination in the
non-financial economy. This view is particularly associated with Hyman Minsky
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Minsky (1982), but has also been developed by Paul Volcker (1979) and others.
The financial disarray of the late 1980s – the last period before the recession
of 2008-2009 of sharply tightening credit constraints and widespread defaults –
gave rise to a number of papers exploring the importance of the liability side of
household balance sheets. (Caskey and Fazzari, 1989; Jarsulic, 1989; Palley, 1994)
Recent theoretical and empirical work has revived this line of inquiry, seeking to
show that the accumulation of debt in the household sector, and the subsequent
behavioral adjustment of heterogeneous households to shocks in household bal-
ance sheets, might help explain the prolonged state of depressed demand observed
currently in the U.S. and elsewhere. (Hall, 2011a,b; Eggertson and Krugman,
2010; Guererri and Lorenzoni, 2011; Philippon and Midrigan, 2011) Similar anal-
ysis has been applied to the Great Depression and the Japanese “lost decades.”
(Olney, 1999; Mishkin, 1978; Koo, 2008) In these models, heavily indebted house-
holds cut back consumption in the face of a shock to assets (such as a fall in
house values), but less indebted households do not increase consumption in simi-
lar proportion for various reasons (financial frictions, zero lower bounds), thereby
causing a recession that cannot easily be remedied by traditional policy instru-
ments. Mian, Rao and Sufi (2011) provide empirical evidence that household
debt accumulated in the mid 2000s contributed to depressed consumption in the
recession of 2007-2009. These papers support the view that gross household debt,
or leverage, is a legitimate object of inquiry independent of net saving.
An important early attempt to understand the macroeconomic implications of
the interaction of changes in income, interest rates and the price level with existing
stocks of debt was Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation theory of depressions. (Fisher,
1933) The starting point in his analysis was that even as households reduced
borrowing after 1929, falling prices and incomes led to rising debt burdens. Fisher
argued that the increase in current debt-income ratios resulting from falling prices
and incomes was an important part of the explanation for falling output in the
Depression. We build on Fisher’s insight (hence “Fisher dynamics”) in developing
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our more general account of how observed leverage is affected by changes in income
growth, inflation and interest rates.
III. Methodology
A. Debt Dynamics
We analyze changes in private leverage using a modified version of “the least
controversial equation in macroeconomics,” (Hall and Sargent, 2011, p. 2) the law
of motion of government debt:
(1) bt+1 = dt + (
1 + i
1 + g + pi
)bt
∆bt = bt+1 − bt = dt + ( i− g − pi
1 + g + pi
)bt
where b is the ratio of gross debt to GDP, d is the ratio of the primary deficit –
that is, deficit net of interest payments – to GDP, i is the nominal interest rate,
g is the real growth rate of GDP, and pi is the inflation rate. The key point, well
understood in the context of public debt, is that the evolution of debt ratios is
not solely determined by public-sector borrowing; the primary balance, interest
rates, growth rates and inflation each play an independent role. (Escolano, 2010)
The equation itself may or may not be an accounting identity, depending on how
broadly d is defined. In some applications, an explicit stock-flow adjustment term
is added on the right-hand side to capture changes in public debt not arising from
deficits (such as assumptions of private debt); in others, d is implicitly defined
to include all actions that increase or decrease the stock of debt. (Aizenman and
Marion, 2009)
The typical application of this equation is to decompose changes in the public
debt-GDP ratio over time, generally into changes due to the primary balance, the
real growth rate, the nominal interest rate, and inflation. Decompositions of the
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changes in the debt-GDP ratio have been carried out for various countries and
periods, including the US (Hall and Sargent, 2011; Aizenman and Marion, 2009),
the UK (Buiter, 1985; Das, 2011), India (Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2003), and
more or less broad sets of countries (Giannitsarou and Scott, 2008; Abbas et al.,
2011). A common finding in these papers is that changes in growth, inflation
and interest rates play a large role in the evolution of public-debt GDP ratios
historically. In particular, the fall in debt-GDP ratios in most advanced countries
in the decades after World War II is primariy explained by growth rates in excess
of interest rates; in many countries, public debt-GDP ratios fell substantially even
though governments rarely or never ran primary surpluses.
To apply the public debt decomposition to private debt, we apply the same
notion of primary balance to non-government sectors. For the household sector,
we replace GDP with personal income.2
B. Data and Variable Definitions
Except where otherwise noted, data used for the decompositions is drawn from
the National Income and Product Accounts and their predecessor series. In order
to separate out the contributions of the variables, we use a linear approximation
of Equation 1:
(2) ∆bt ≈ dt + (it − gt − pit)bt−1
For the range of values of i, g and pi observed historically (almost never above
0.1 in absolute value, and seldom above 0.05), the approximation is very close.
The variables are defined as follows. (Data sources and values for all years are
given in the Appendix.)
Income. Our measure of income is personal income less imputed noncash income
2We discuss possible alternative denominators in Section VI below.
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Figure 2. i, g and pi for Household Debt, 1929-2010.
Note: The lines show the behavior of the three key Fisher-dynamics variables since 1929. Adjusted
income is calculated as described in the text; nominal income growth is the sum of real income growth
and inflation. The effective interest rate is total household interest payments divided by the start-of-
period stock of household debt. When the effective interest rate exceeds nominal income growth, a
household primary balance of zero implies rising leverage; when nominal growth exceeds the effective
interest rate, a primary balance of zero implies falling leverage.
of persons; this is referred to below as adjusted personal income. Our
reasons for excluding imputed flows of non-market services are that credit
market borrowing depends on the difference between money outlays and
money income, and that only cash income is available for debt service.
Debt. The stock variable b is the end-of-period value of total credit market lia-
bilities, divided by adjusted personal income. Debt, as defined here, does
not include non-credit liabilities. These are a small portion – less than 2
percent in recent years – of total household liabilities, consisting mainly of
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security credit. Including these liabilities in our debt measure would not
affect our qualitative results.
Interest rates. Interest payments are gross interest paid by households. (Gross
rather than net interest is is appropriate since interest income is included
in disposable personal income.) The effective interest rate i is total interest
payments divided by the stock of debt at the start of the period. In other
words, it is the average interest rate on the current debt stock, not the
marginal rate on new borrowing.
Primary balance. The household primary deficit d is calculated as net bor-
rowing minus interest payments, divided by adjusted disposable personal
income. Household net borrowing is equal to the change in credit market
liabilities from the end of the previous year. This is equivalent to the way
the primary deficit is calculated for governments. Note that borrowing flows
are not observed directly in the Flow of Funds. All credit flow series are
computed from the change in liabilities. Among other things, this means
that defaults show up as lower net borrowing (and more positive primary
balances). (See discussion in Section V.) This means that we cannot include
a separate measurement error term; any errors also show up in the primary
balance d.
Growth and inflation rates. Growth g and inflation pi are the percent changes
in the level of adjusted income and the personal consumption expenditure
(PCE) deflator, respectively, from the previous year.3
Our primary balance measure differs from the conventional savings rate because
we do not count interest payments as consumption, and we group consumption
less interest payments, acquisition of tangible assets, and acquisition of financial
3Conceptually, the ideal inflation measure would reflect the change in household income attributable
to inflation. The PCE or CPI is appropriate for this purpose if we think that wages are set in real terms,
but over short periods this may be a misleading assumption; the GDP deflator or an index of unit labor
costs might be more appropriate. Fortunately, the various indexes move broadly together, so our results
are not qualitatively affected, but this is a question worth returning to in the future.
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assets together as “expenditure.” While consolidating these flows is unusual, it is
logical when the focus is specifically a consistent accounting for the evolution of
household debt. A change in any of these flows relative to income has the same
implications for new household borrowing.4
In principle, debt writeoffs should be a separate term in Equation 1. But since it
is impossible to get a consistent series for household debt defaults for most of our
period, defaults are instead included in the primary balance term as a lower deficit
d. This results in an excessively high measure of household primary surpluses,
particularly since 2008. Section V offers corrected numbers for the most recent
period. A related problem, which we have not been able to correct for, is the
fact that many loans have a period of nonperformance before being written off;
since our interest rate measure is the ratio of total interest payments to the face
value of outstanding debt, this means our measure of the effective interest rate
is biased downwards in proportion to the fraction of nonperforming loans. We
do not believe this materially affects our results. But it is worth raising, since it
means that the already-large role of defaults in explaining household deleveraging
after 2008, as reported in the section on defaults, is to some degree understated.
Figure 2 and Table 1 show the behavior of the three “Fisher variables” over the
whole 1929-2011 period. Note that the effective interest series is very smooth com-
pared with the federal funds rate, and usually significantly higher. The smooth-
ness of the effective interest rate series reflects both the fact that the effective
interest rate in any given year reflect debts incurred over many previous years,
and the fact that the market rate faced by private borrowers generally moves than
less than one for one with the policy rate. Note in particular that the effective
real interest rate faced by households was positive in every year but 1974, and has
remained well above zero even during the most recent period when the nominal
federal funds rate has been fixed at zero.
4Cynamon and Fazzari (2013) takes a similar approach.
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IV. Results
The relationship between primary deficit and inflation, growth and interest
rates varies across periods. For the evolution of debt ratios, the most important
question is whether nominal interest rates are greater or less than the sum of
real growth and inflation. The higher are nominal interest rates compared with
nominal growth rates (or, equivalently, real interest rates compared with real
growth rates), the greater will be the increase in debt ratios for a given level
of new borrowing. When interest rates exceed growth rates, a primary balance
of zero will imply rising leverage, while when growth rates exceed interest rates,
a primary balance of zero will imply falling leverage. Over the full 1929-2011
period, the two cases (i > g + pi and i < g + pi) are about equally common.
There are three distinct periods in the data. Before 1945, nominal growth rates
fluctuate wildly, with periods both well above and well below the effective nominal
interest rate. Between 1945 and 1980, nominal growth and nominal interest rates
are stable and approximately equal. And since 1980, the nominal growth rate
is almost always below the nominal effective interest rate. The most important
factor in these shifts has been the large variations in inflation over the century;
real income growth also played a large role in the 1930s and 40s, and again after
2007. Apart from the spike around 1980, nominal effective interest rates vary
less, although the increase in interest rates in 1980s also contributed to the shift
to a regime of i > g + pi.
Figure 3 shows annual changes in leverage and the contributions of new bor-
rowing (expenditure minus income) and the three Fisher variables respectively.
The contribution of each Fisher variable to the change in leverage (shown indi-
vidually in Table 2) is equal to the value of the variable multiplied by the debt
stock at the end of the previous period. Figure 3 shows that over some periods –
especially between 1945 and 1980, and in the housing boom period of the 2000s
– changes in leverage track new borrowing (the primary deficit) closely. But over
other periods, the two correspond less closely. In the 1930s, the trajectories of
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Figure 3. Borrowing and Fisher Dynamics Contribution to Changes in Household Leverage.
Note: The heavy line shows the annual change in the ratio of household debt to household income.
The gray bars and empty bars show the respective contributions to the change in leverage of net new
borrowing on the one hand and of the interest, inflation and growth rates (the Fisher variables), on the
other. Negative borrowing corresponds to running a primary surplus. See text for data sources.
debt-income ratios and of new borrowing are almost inverted. Comparing the
period 1965-1980 to the period 1980-2000, we see that households were running
primary deficits (expenditure exceeded income) in the first period, but primary
surpluses in the second; but household leverage was essentially flat in the first
period and rose sharply in the second.
The goal of this exercise is to distinguish the changes in leverage resulting
from variation in credit-financed household expenditure, from changes resulting
mechanically from the Fisher variables – that is, to compare the actual trajectory
of debt-income ratios from the trajectory that the same levels of new borrowing
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would have produced in a world where real interest and growth rates were constant
or moved together. So we see that, compared with the path that leverage would
have followed in a world of a stable relationship between real interest and growth
rates, household leverage grew much more rapidly in the early 1930s. That is,
the shift from rising debt in the early 1930s to falling debt in the alter 1930s
does not reflect a fall in new borrowing, but rather is an artifact of the very large
swings in price and income growth rates in this decade.5 In the 1940s, growth and
inflation rose sharply but average interest rates did not (reflecting interest-rate
ceilings and related policies of financial repression adopted during World War II),
meaning that leverage ratios fell more than they otherwise would have. Changes
in the Fisher variables were less dramatic after the war, but still important.
Compared with a world of stable of interest and growth rates, household leverage
rose somewhat more in the immediate postwar period and especially in the 1980s,
and less in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, the fall in leverage since 2007 would
have been larger in the absence of the sharp fall in inflation and income growth
in this period.
Figure 4 expands on Figure 3 and decomposes the aggregated Fisher-variable
trajectory into the contributions of its three component variables. The bars show
the aggregate contribution of the three variables, as in Figure 3. The lines show
the contributions of each of the three components.6 One clearly sees here the
extent to which falling income raised leverage in the early 1930s and in 2009,
and how deflation raised leverage in the 1930s and inflation held it down in the
later 1960s and 1970s. Another striking feature is the large increase in the con-
tribution of interest payments to leverage in the 1980s, and stability thereafter.
The relatively constant interest contribution over past 25 years reflects fact that
interest rates facing households have declined at about the same rate as debt
5We should stress here that we are not describing a counterfactual scenario, which would also involve
postulating alternative trajectories of borrowing behavior, for which our accounting framework provides
no guidance. Rather, we are simply calling attention to the ways the trajectory of household debt ratios
has systematically deviated from the trajectory of household borrowing behavior.
6The lines show the respective contributions to the growth of leverage, not the variables themselves
– that is, they show each variable times the start-of-period debt stock.
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Figure 4. Contribution of ’Fisher dynamics’ to Leverage by component, 1929-2011.
Note: This figure shows the shares of leverage accounted for by the three variables. The bar is the
contribution of the the Fisher variables, the three lines break up the contributions by the real growth
rate of household income (thick grey line), inflation (solid) and the nominal interest rate (dotted)
ratio has increased, resulting in constant debt-service burden. Another way of
looking at this is that while average interest rate has declined since 1980s, it has
declined more slowly than inflation, so that real interest rates facing households
have remained higher than in the pre-1980 decades. (Mason and Jayadev, 2013)
In effect, the contribution of interest payments to rising leverage after 1990 is a
reflection of the disinflation of the 1980s.
Table 2 presents the same information as Figures 3 and 4. It outlines seven
distinct periods. The exact periodization is not based on any formal test, and
nothing hinges on the precise dates chosen; but visual inspection of the figures
does suggest important variation in the relations among the variables across these
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Table 1—Average Values of the “Fisher Variables” by Period, 1929-2011
Period i g pi
1929 to 1932 8.1 -5.6 -7.6
1933 to 1945 6.4 7.3 4.1
1946 to 1964 6.5 3.8 2.3
1965 to 1980 8.2 4.0 6.1
1981 to 1999 10.1 3.3 3.1
2000 to 2007 7.3 2.4 2.4
2008 to 2011 5.8 -0.5 1.5
Note: This shows the average values of the effective interest rates faced by households, the growth rate
of adjusted household income, and inflation for seven periods. See text for details on variable definitions.
Table 2—Average Annual Change in Household Leverage and Components (Percentage
Points)
Attributable to:
Period ∆b d i g pi
1929 to 1932 2.6 -5.6 2.9 2.1 2.7
1933 to 1945 -1.9 -0.8 1.8 -2.3 -1.0
1946 to 1964 2.3 2.2 2.7 -1.6 -0.8
1965 to 1980 -0.2 0.9 4.7 -2.3 -3.5
1981 to 1999 1.3 -1.3 7.1 -2.4 -2.4
2000 to 2007 4.7 2.7 7.3 -2.6 -2.6
2008 to 2011 -3.1 -9.0 6.8 0.6 -1.8
Note: This shows the annual change in the household debt-income ratio in seven distinct periods (first
column) and the contributions to that change of primary deficits and interest, growth and inflation rates.
A negative number represents a component reducing in leverage and a positive number one increasing
it. The sum of the contributions is not exactly equal to the change in the debt ratio due to interaction
effects. The variables are defined as in Figure 4.
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periods. Comparing the first two periods, we see that household debt-income
ratios rose by an average of 2.5 points per year from 1930 through 1933, and then
fell at 2.3 points per year from 1933 to 1945. But the household primary balance
moved in the opposite direction as one would naively expect, with households
paying down debt equal to 6 percent of income in the period of rising leverage
and only 1 percent of income in the period of falling leverage. Looking at the final
three columns, we see that positive nominal interest rates, falling real income, and
deflation contributed about equally to the rise in debt-income ratios in the early
1930s. Changes in debt-income ratios corresponded more closely to household
primary balances during the postwar decades. The 2.6 percentage point annual
increase in leverage in the 15 years after the war is only slightly greater than
the large primary deficits in this period, primarily mortgage borrowing.7 The
stabilization of leverage after the mid-1960s reflects lower household expenditure
relative to income; but faster income growth and, especially, higher inflation also
played important roles, reducing leverage annually by one point and 2.5 points
more than in the preceding period, respectively.
Leverage resumed its rise after 1980, increasing by an average of 1.4 points an-
nually during the 1980s and 1990s. A large part of this rise can be attributed, in
an accounting sense, to lower inflation, but the most important factor was higher
interest payments. In this sense, the period can be understood as a slow-motion
debt deflation (or debt-disinflation), with the combination of slower nominal in-
come growth and higher interest rates producing rising debt-income ratios despite
a substantial fall in household spending relative to income. The contrasts between
the early and the later 1930s, and between the 1960s-1970s and the 1980s-1990s,
both show how in an environment of changing Fisher dynamics, the intertemporal
effect of household credit transactions can be to transfer expenditure away from
7The high level of mortgage borrowing in the 1950s presumably resulted from, in addition to pent-
up housing demand, a number of regulatory changes intended to encourage home mortgage borrowing,
such as mortgage guarantees through the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Adminis-
tration, and more favorable treatment of mortgage borrowing in the tax code. (Garriga, Chambers and
Schlagenhauf, 2012)
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the periods with rising debt-income ratios. This does not directly address the
question of what fundamental factors were responsible for changes in household
borrowing behavior, but the timing of those factors may need to be reevaluated.
By contrast, Fisher dynamics do not change the conventional picture of rising
debt in the first half of the 2000s. The acceleration of leverage after 1999 is largely
attributable to higher primary deficits – this period saw the highest sustained
levels of expenditure relative to income of the whole series, as is also clearly
visible in Figure 3. Leverage would have risen even faster in this period if not
for an acceleration in income growth (and in defaults, as discussed in Section V).
Similarly, the fall in household debt-income ratios after 2007 reflects a sharp fall
in expenditure relative to income, with households moving from large primary
deficits to large primary surpluses. But the link between new borrowing and debt
growth is somewhat weaker in this final period: The fall in leverage was much less
than what the shift from net new borrowing to net pay-down of debt would imply,
because of the simultaneous deceleration of income growth, to slightly below zero
for those four years. As a result, while households’ cumulative surpluses over
2008-2011 were approximately equal to the cumulative deficits over 2000-2007,
the fall in leverage in the latter period was much smaller in magnitude than the
rise in the former period.
V. Defaults
An important difference between private and public sector debt dynamics is
that for public debt, defaults are discrete, rare events. By contrast some fraction
of private debt is written off by lenders every year. So the law of motion for
private debt should include an additional term on the right-hand side for defaults.
Unfortunately, there does not exist a good series for defaults covering our full
period. The Flow of Funds does not record defaults; since net borrowing is
computed from the change in debt stock, defaults appear in the FFA as reduced
borrowing. We have followed this same approach in our main results. But our
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accounting framework would be more meaningful if we were able to consistently
distinguish a higher default rate from a higher primary balance.
A number of data sources do allow for estimates of the fraction of household
debt written off in recent periods. Since 1999, the New York Federal Reserve’s
Consumer Credit Panel (CCP) has tracked household credit flows, including de-
faults, directly. (Lee and van der Klaauw, 2010) To our knowledge, this is the only
source that captures the full universe of household debt writeoffs; importantly, it
measures gross rather than net writeoffs. Using it, we can construct a series for
the contribution of defaults to changes in household leverage for the most recent
period.8
While the CCP measure is conceptually the correct one for our purposes, its
limited time coverage is a problem, so we also consider two other measures of
household debt writeoffs. From 1985, the Fed reports commercial bank default
losses on various categories of loans, including credit cards, other consumer loans,
and residential mortgages.9 By applying these rates to the actual distribution
of household debt, we can come up with a imputed figure for the fraction of
household debt written off annually. There are two major problems with this
series, however. First, the default experience of debt held by commercial banks
may be significantly different from that of other household debt; this is more
likely in periods where a large fraction of household debt is securitized. Second,
the writeoffs reported in this series are not gross, but net of recoveries. This does
not bias the series as much as one might fear, since the bulk of household defaults
have always been on unsecured loans; but it is a problem in the more recent
period when mortgage defaults have increased in importance, since recovery rates
on mortgages average well over 50 percent.
Finally, since 1934 commercial banks have reported all default losses to the
8While writeoffs are measured in the underlying panel data, they are not reported in the main
publication based on the CCP, the Quarterly Report on Consumer Credit and Debt. On the advice of
Meta Brown at the New York Fed, we have constructed our default series by combining the Quarterly
Report on Consumer Credit and Debt with the default data reported in Haughwout et al. (2012).
9We would prefer only owner-occupied mortgages, but they are not reported separately, so we use
the rate for 1-4 family residences, the vast majority of which are owner-occupied.
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FDIC. This series has the longest time coverage, and also has the advantage of
reporting both gross and net default rates. But it does not distinguish household
debt from other categories of debt. Since business and, especially, commercial
real-estate loans generally default at substantially higher rates than household
loans, and since there is not a strong correlation between periods of high household
debt defaults and high defaults in other categories of loans, this series is not a
good guide to short-term movements in default rates. Like the previous series,
it also does not capture the default experience of lenders other than commercial
banks. It does allow us, however, to put a rough ceiling on default rates during the
postwar period. Between 1945 and 1980, gross charge-offs at commercial banks
averaged 0.2 percent of outstanding loans. Since household debt represented
about half of debt in this period (both debt held by commercial banks and debt
in the aggregate), this implies that if there were no defaults on non-household
debt, no more than 0.4 percent of household debt could have been discharged
by default in any given year. Since non-household loans do in fact default, we
can conclude that the annual default rate on household debt over the 1945-1980
period was probably lower than 0.2 percent.10
Figure 5 shows the fraction of loans to households written off by each of these
three measures. As we see, in periods where multiple measures are available, they
behave roughly similarly, apart from the spike in the FDIC measure in the late
1980s reflecting elevated commercial real-estate defaults in this period. By all
three measures it is clear that the default experience of the Great Recession is
without precedent in the postwar era. From 2000 to 2006, according to the CCP
data, an average of 1.1 percent of household debt was written off each year. For
2008-2010, that rises to 3.3 percent. So while the failure to distinguish defaults
from the primary balance probably does not affect the results for most of the
postwar era, it may be important for the most recent period.
10Again, this refers only to debt held by commercial banks. But commercial banks accounted for
a much larger share of credit in this period, and in the period before securitization allowed for the
unbundling and reallocation of credit risk, it seems unlikely that the default experience of nonbank
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Figure 5. Annual Share of Debt Written Off, 1985-2011.
Note: The lines depict writeoff rates as a fraction of debt outstanding, from three sources. Default
series 1 is the gross writeoff rate for all loans by commercial banks, as reported by the FDIC. Default
series 2 is the net writeoff rate for commercial bank loans to households, as reported by the Federal
Reserve. Default series 3 is the gross writeoff rate for all household debt, as reported in the New York
Fed Consumer Credit Panel (CCP). Series 3 is the preferred measure for our purposes.
Figure 6 and Table 3 show how our results for the recent period are modified by
taking into account of defaults. For the contribution of defaults, we use the CCP
series for 2000-2011 and the Fed commercial bank series for 1985-1999. (Because
the table shows the contribution to the change in leverage, defaults are reported
as a fraction of income rather than a fraction of outstanding debt.) Figure 6 shows
the same primary deficit as above, but Table 3 shows the primary deficit adjusted
to take defaults into account. While the reduction of leverage attributable to
defaults is small for the first two periods, it is substantial in the final period.
lenders was dramatically different.
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Nearly half of the apparent primary surpluses over 2008-2011 (8.7 percent average)
is due to writeoffs rather than reduced household expenditure. Since the 2.6
point increase in the default contribution accounts for over 80 percent of the
reduction in leverage over 2008-2011, it appears that even the very large swing in
household balances toward surplus would have been insufficient to substantially
reduce leverage in the absence of increased default rates. This has important
implications for the degree to which changes in household borrowing behavior
will be sufficient to reduce leverage in the future.
Unfortunately, we are not able to produce a systematic estimate comparable to
that in Table 3 for the fraction of household primary surpluses in the pre-World
War II period that should be attributed to defaults. But there is some evidence
that defaults were an important factor in the trajectory of household debt in the
1930s. (Olney, 1999)
Table 3—Average Annual Change in Household Leverage and Components Accounting for
Defaults.
Attributable to:
Period ∆b d - defaults Defaults i g pi
Defaults Measured as Net Chargeoffs of Household Debt by Commercial Banks
1985 to 1999 1.4 -0.8 -0.5 7.2 -2.5 -2.0
2000 to 2007 4.7 3.5 -0.8 7.3 -2.6 -2.6
2008 to 2011 -3.1 -5.9 - 3.1 6.8 0.6 -1.8
Defaults Measured Directly at Household Level
2000 to 2007 4.7 3.9 -1.2 7.3 -2.6 -2.6
2008 to 2011 -3.1 -5.1 - 3.8 6.8 0.6 -1.8
Note: This is equivalent to Table 2, except that defaults are broken out as a separate component of
leverage changes. In the first panel, defaults are measured as the net charge off rate of loans to households
as reported by commercial banks; in the second panel, defaults are measured directly as gross default
rates at the household level. The periodization reflects data availability: Commercial bank chargeoffs
of household debt are available only from 1985, and household level default data is available only from
2000. See text for sources.
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Figure 6. Contribution of Deficit, Accounting for Defaults, 1985-2010.
Note: The empty bars show the same household primary deficit as in Figure 3. The solid bars show the
contribution of debt defaults to the observed balance. The difference between the two bars represents
the true level of household new borrowing once defaults are accounted for. The default rate used here is
the net writeoff rate for commercial bank loans to households.
VI. Conceptual Issues in the Measurement of Household Leverage
Apart from our definition of the household primary balance, all our data def-
initions are standard. Nevertheless, they raise some conceptual and practical
issues.
A. Face Value or Market Value of Debt
Like almost all published studies of household debt, this paper uses the face
value rather than the market value of household liabilities. But is this appropri-
ate? Shouldn’t a rise in market interest rates implies a capital gain for economic
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units owing fixed-rate debt, just as it implies a capital loss for the owners of such
debt?11 The suggestion that credit-market liabilities should be revalued each pe-
riod on the basis of current interest rates is a logical one, and it is occasionally
followed in the literature on public debt. (Hall and Sargent, 2011; Sbrancia, 2011)
Nonetheless, we believe face value is the appropriate measure , for several reasons.
First, as discussed in Section II above, focusing on the liability side of balance
sheets is justified only where questions about repayment capacity are important.
Changes in the market value of fixed-rate debt have no effect on the ratio of
debt service payments to the income out of which those payments must be made.
Second, there is an asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Most lenders
participate in the secondary market for debt; even when particular contracts are
held to maturity, the option to hypothecate or sell in the secondary market is still
important. With very few exceptions, borrowers, especially household borrowers,
do not participate in secondary markets for their own liabilities. One possible
exception is that when debt carries a high default risk, debtors may seek to
repurchase the debt at the discounted market value. This is occasionally seen in
the case of defaults and near-defaults by sovereigns, but there do not seem to be
any equivalent cases for households.12 Refinancings might seem to be an obvious
exception to this statement, but they are not. Mortgage refinancing does not
involve repurchase of the debt at market value, but on the exercise of the option
embedded in many debt contracts for early payment of the face value. Third,
we use the face value of debt because that is what is used in virtually all official
measures of liabilities, including not only US measures like the Flow of Funds
but measures like the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. (Antoniewicz,
1996; Begenau, Piazzesi and Schneider, 2012; Dawson, 1996) To our knowledge,
there is no major published measure of household-sector liabilities that adjusts
11We thank two anonymous referees for raising this issue.
12The Occupy Debt/Rolling Jubilee project was an attempt to take advantage of discounted market
prices of household debt along these lines. (See www.strikedebt.org.) To date this kind of repurchase of
distressed household debt on behalf of the debtors has not taken place on a macro economically important
scale.
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the value of debt for changes in market interest rates. While this consensus
among statistical agencies does not mean that there is no theoretical interest in
alternative measures, it does offer some justification for our use of face value.
Finally, the adjustment the impossible in practice, at least with existing data,
since it requires disaggregating the debt stock both by the interest rate at which
it was incurred and the appropriate interest rate to discount it by in subsequent
periods. Even in contexts where, in principle, adjusting the value of liabilities
for market rates is desirable, the adjustment requires an ability to track distinct
vintages of different instruments in a way that no publicly available data source
currently allows. (Begenau, Piazzesi and Schneider, 2012) But even if it were,
we do not believe that the adjustment is relevant for this paper, since debtors’
capital gains and losses are purely notional and do not affect repayment capacity.
B. Alternative Measures of Leverage
Arguably, a better way of capturing debt-service capacity would be to focus
on asset-liability mismatch. This would mean netting assets from liabilities nei-
ther completely, as in the conventional savings measure, nor not at all, as in our
primary-balance measure, but partially, to the extent that they can be readily
sold or hypothecated to meet immediate cash commitments.13 This suggestion is
appealing but is unlikely to improve on the more widely-used debt-income ratio
as an index of household leverage. While most households do have both assets
and liabilities, only a small fraction of assets are plausibly available for debt ser-
vice commitments. Unsecured debt in general carries a higher interest rate than
any asset available to households, so a household would not be expected to take
on such debt if it held readily salable assets. Secured debt, on the other hand,
is usually incurred to acquire lumpy, illiquid assets such as houses or cars. Stu-
dent loans, an increasing fraction of household debt, finance the acquisition of
maximally illiquid assets, for which there is no secondary market at all. In some
13This suggestion was made by both Perry Mehrling and Peter Skott in response to earlier drafts of
this paper.
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cases, public subsidies allow households to acquire assets with a return higher
than the rate they face as borrowers, which in principle could lead to household
holding both debt and liquid assets. But in such cases there are typically legal or
institutional obstacles to using the assets to meet debt commitments. The fact
that most households hold checking accounts or similar transactions balances is
further evidence for the illiquidity of most household assets, since otherwise there
would be no reason to hold savings in this very low return form. The conven-
tional use of debt-income ratios as a measure of debt-service capacity therefore
seems reasonable. It also avoids the substantial practical difficulties in measuring
the liquidity of household assets and comparing the distribution of assets across
households to the distribution of debt.
It also might be more appropriate to use a different income flow for debt-service
capacity, such as GDP or some measure of debtor-unit incomes. Scaling by GDP
is useful for comparing leverage across sectors, but is less suitable for a discussion
of household leverage specifically. Since discussion of leverage is motivated by
an interest in the size of the debt stock relative to capacity for repayment, the
appropriate denominator for household leverage is a measure of the money income
of the household sector. Even if households are the residual claimants of business
income and see their future income move with the government fiscal position, in a
world where credit constraints are real and important – as discussions of leverage
must assume – these future income streams are not available to meet current debt
service obligations. So to the extent a change in retained profits, the government
balance, or other flows of to non-household sectors cause personal income to
diverge from GDP, personal income is the more appropriate denominator.
The question of whether income should be some measure of debtor-unit income
is less clearcut. There can be no meaningful measure of the income of “debtor
households”: A large majority of households have both assets and liabilities, and
some debt is owed by households that are lenders on net, so it is impossible to
divide households into debtors and creditors and presume that debt is carried
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only by the former. In principle it would, however, be possible to construct a
measure of “debtor income” by weighting each household’s income by its debt.
And while there is not a clear separation of households into debtors and creditors,
the distribution of debt with respect to income has certainly changed over time.
To the extent that debt becomes more concentrated in the upper part of the
income distribution, leverage – debt relative to repayment capacity – will be
lower; to the extent that is distributed further down the distribution, leverage
will be greater. A measure of debtor-weighted income could take such shifts into
account. On the other hand, households’ position in the distribution may shift
frequently, and to the extent there are significant transfers between households
(for instance as a result of family ties) the current distribution of debt with respect
to income is less informative, and the aggregate measure is more meaningful. The
debt-personal income measure of leverage is therefore meaningful, and even if a
comprehensive panel data set were available to construct a debt-weighted measure
of income, we would want to use both measures to examine Fisher dynamics. In
practice, the question of whether a debt-weighted measure of income would be
desirable is a non-issue, since the data does not exist to construct it. The Survey of
Consumer of Finances is the most suitable data source, but it is a triennial survey
that starts only in 1983, and a main goal of this paper is to provide a consistent
accounting for a long period. We are particularly interested in comparing the
more recent changes in debt ratios to those in the 1930s, and in clarifying the
contrast between stable household leverage before 1980 and rising leverage after;
a series that starts in the 1980s is not suitable for either goal.
VII. Conclusion
While accounting identities such as the one we use cannot be used to establish
causal claims, specific historical accounts of causal relationships need to be com-
patible with the facts derived from such an accounting. Whatever fundamental
factors are responsible for changes in households’ desired intertemporal allocation
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of expenditure via credit markets, its reflection in observed debt-income ratios
will be altered when income growth, inflation and interest rates change. For any
given intertemporal allocation, observed debt-GDP ratios will rise faster in peri-
ods of high i and low pi and g, and vice versa. As we show, these distortions are
quantitatively important – in several important cases, the actual change in new
borrowing by households has the opposite sign as implied by a naive examination
of observed debt-income ratios.
In our decomposition we showed that the rise in the leverage observed between
1980 and 1998 was not associated with greater net new borrowing in this period.
Several explanations for the rise of household debt assume that this was due
to higher net borrowing either because of financial innovation (Debelle, 2004),
changing discount rates (Parker, 1999) or increased income dispersion (Pollin,
1988, 1990; Sturn and van Treek, forthcoming) Our analysis suggests that any
causal story of household debt , whether based on credit-market frictions, in-
tertemporal preferences, or other factors, it needs to explain not why household
expenditure was higher relative to income in the 1980s than in other periods, but
why it was lower.14
A further divergence between borrowing behavior and observed debt-income
ratios is created by defaults. Since the official measures of borrowing flows, as
reported in the Flow of Funds, do not distinguish defaults, they systematically
underestimate new borrowing (or overestimate debt pay-down) in periods when
defaults are high. Again, failing to correct for this may mean that observed
changes in leverage give a misleading impression of the underlying economic pro-
cesses at work. In the post-2007 period, in particular, an exceptionally high
default rate means that households appear to be paying down debt at twice the
rate that they really are. Failing to take into account that half of household’s
apparent surpluses are really defaults may lead to wrong conclusions about both
14Household consumption did rise during the 1980s, but this was offset by a larger fall in net ac-
quisition of real and financial assets; housing investment in particular was unusually low. So while the
conventionally measured savings rate did fall after 1980, this is separate from the rise in household debt.
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the mechanisms responsible for falling output in the 2007-2010 period, and the
range of household behavior likely in the future.
Data Appendix
Data is defined as follows:
i is the total annual interest payments by households, divided by household
credit-market liabilities for the first quarter of the year. Interest payments are
taken from Table 7.11 of the NIPAs.
g is the growth rate of personal income less non cash imputations (referred to as
adjusted personal income), from the first quarter of the year to the first quarter
of the following year. Personal income less noncash imputations is given in NIPA
Table 7.12, line 60.
pi is the percentage change in the personal consumption deflator from January
of this year to January of the following year.
b is the stock of debt divided by adjusted personal income, for the first quarter
of the year. For 1947 and later years, the debt stock is taken from the Flow of
Funds. For years prior to 1947, it is from the Historical Statistics of the United
States.
d is the change in debt from the first quarter of the year to the first quarter
of the following year, less total interest payments, divided by adjusted personal
income for the first quarter of the year.
The contributions of i, pi and g to the change in the debt ratio are equal to the
variable times the start-of-period debt ratio.
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